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Abstract 
Two results are shown about the free-entry equilibrium in a Cournot market with asymmetric firms and imperfectly 
substituting goods. First, only one technology will survive in the production of each good. Second, some good(s) may 
not be produced. Specifically, we show that in a two-good model only one good is produced if the substitution 
parameter is higher than a critical value and both goods are produced for smaller substitution parameter values.
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper is concerned with free entry under imperfect competition. We study the 
free entry equilibrium in a Cournot market with asymmetric firms and imperfectly 
substituting goods.  
Economists have long been interested in the free entry equilibrium in imperfectly 
competitive markets. The papers by Guesnerie and Hart (1985), Mankiw and Whinston 
(1986), and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) all study free entry in a homogeneous good market 
with imperfect competition. They establish that entry biases exist if firms are not behaving as 
perfect competitors. For example, Mankiw & Whinston (1986) consider a homogeneous good 
market with identical firms engaging in Cournot quantity competition. They show that free 
entry entails excessive entry from a social welfare point of view. Recently, Gotz (2005) and 
Ohkawa et al. (2005) examine market selection of production technologies under Cournot 
competition and free entry. They establish that only one type of technologies (or firms) can 
survive in a free entry homogenous good Cournot market. 
The present paper extends the existing literature on free entry under imperfect 
competition by examining a differentiated goods market. We focus on a market with two 
imperfectly substituting goods each of which can be produced by multiple technologies (types 
of firm). Two results are established. First, in the free entry equilibrium, each good is 
produced by only one type of firm. This generalizes the market selection result by Gotz 
(2005) and Ohkawa et al. (2005) to a differentiated goods setting. Second, we show that free 
entry may lead to only one of the goods being produced in equilibrium. This is a new result 
that implies that free entry in a Cournot market may lead to under-provision of goods. 
We use a symmetric linear demand system so as to have a mathematically easily 
tractable model. Symmetric demands for the goods help highlight that under-provision of 
goods is not caused by lack of demand but rather due to the effect of entry and the presence of 
asymmetry in production technology. The results in the paper should hold under more general 
demand frameworks and cost structures.  
 
2.  The Model 
 
Let  i P  and  i Q  denote the price and total quantity of good i (i = 1, 2). We consider the 
following linear (inverse) market demand equations: 
 
1 12 P QQ =α− −γ ,  2 12 P QQ =α−γ − , 
 
where  0 α>  is the maximum price consumers are willing to pay for either good and  [0,1] γ∈  
is the substitution parameter. The two goods are independent if  0 γ=  and are perfect 2 
 
substitutes if  1 γ= . Good i can be produced by  i N  technologies (types of firms). Type j (j = 
1,…, i N ) good i producers have the production technology that has constant marginal cost  ij c  
and fixed cost  ij f . We assume that  ij c α>  for all i and j.  
Firms play the Cournot quantity game. We first discuss the Cournot equilibrium when 
the number of firms is fixed for each type (technology) of either good.
1
1 N
 Consider a 
representative type j (j = 1,…, ) good 1 producer. This firm’s profit is given by  
 
1j π  =  1 1j 1j 1j 1j Pq (c q f ) −+  =  1 2 1j 1j 1j ( Q Q c )q f α− −γ − − ,         (1) 
 
where  1j q  denotes the firm’s output. Taking all other firms’ output levels as given, 
maximizing  1j π  with respect to  1j q  yields the first-order condition:  1j 1j 1 2 q cQQ =α− − −γ . 





1j π  = 
* *2
1j 1 2 1j ( c Q Q) f α− − −γ − . 
 
This expression stipulates that in equilibrium each firm’s profit depends only on its 
own cost parameters, the total output by all good 1 producers (
*
1 Q ), and the total output by all 
good 2 producers (
*
2 Q ). It follows immediately that  
 
*
1j 0 π≥ if and only if 
**
1 2 1j QQ d +γ ≤α− ,             (2) 
 
where  1j 1j 1j dc f = +  is type j good 1 firms’ average cost of production if they are the only 
firms in existence in the free-entry equilibrium. Hence, equilibrium profits of type j good 1 
producers are positive if total outputs for goods 1 and 2 are such that 
**
1 2 1j QQ d +γ <α− , and 
are negative if 
**
1 2 1j QQ d +γ >α− . Note that the condition 
**
1 2 1j QQ d +γ ≤α−  is more easily 
satisfied for smaller values of  1j d . This implies that among all good 1 producers those with 
smaller average costs are more likely to be profitable than those with higher average costs.  
Similarly, for a type k (k = 1,…, 2 N ) good 2 producer, 
 
*
2k 0 π≥ if and only if 
**
2 1 2k QQ d +γ ≤α− ,             (3) 
 
                                                            
1 To save on notation, we do not explicitly specify the number of firms for each type of each good. This does not 
hinder our presentation since we need only work with the total equilibrium output of each good. 
2 Here and henceforth, superscript * denotes equilibrium value.  3 
 
where  2k 2k 2k dc f = +  is type k good 2 firms’ average cost of production if they are the only 
firms in existence in the free-entry equilibrium. Hence, equilibrium profit of each type k good 
2 producer is positive if 
**
2 1 2k QQ d +γ <α− , and is negative if 
**
2 1 2k QQ d +γ >α− . It follows 
that among all good 2 producers those with smaller average costs are more likely to be 
profitable than those with higher average costs. 
 
3.  Free-Entry Equilibrium 
 
We shall neglect the improbable case of ties by assuming that  11 1j dd <  for all j = 2,…,
1 N , and  21 2k dd <  for all k = 2,…, 2 N . That is, for each good, there is one technology with the 
smallest average cost.  
The free entry equilibrium can be thought of as being obtained via a two stage game. 
In the first stage, firms of all types decide whether to enter the market. In the second stage, 
firms that entered in the first stage compete in output a la Cournot.
3
Since 
 A firm enters if it has the 
prospect of making a non-negative profit after entry. A firm exits or does not enter if it 
expects to earn a negative profit.  
11 1j dd <  for all j = 2,…, 1 N , by the result in (2), if any other type good 1 
producer has an incentive to stay or enter more type 1 firms will find it profitable to enter. 
Hence, entry of type 1 firms will eventually drive out all other existing types of good 1 firms 
and make entry non-profitable for those types. Mathematically, as the line  1 2 11 QQ d +γ =α−  
lies higher than lines  1 2 1j QQ d +γ =α−  for  j1 >  in the first quadrant of the (Q1, Q2) space, 
entry will not stop until the highest line (i.e.,  1 2 11 QQ d +γ =α− ) is reached. Hence, free entry 
will lead to 
**
1 2 1j QQ d +γ >α−  for all  j1 > , rendering entry non-profitable for good 1 producers 
of all type  j1 > .  
Similarly, the result in (3) implies that only type 1 good 2 producers may survive in 
the free-entry equilibrium. We summarize these discussions in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 1.  In the free-entry equilibrium, only one type of firms may exist for each good.  
 
Gotz (2005) and Ohkawa et al. (2005) establish that only one type of firms survive in a 
free entry homogenous good Cournot market. Proposition 1 generalizes their result to a model 
                                                            
3 Alternatively, one can think of an entry-exit dynamic process starting from an initial configuration of different 
types of firms. This process should arrive at the same equilibrium outcome as the two-stage game. 4 
 
with two substituting goods.
4
Our next result goes beyond Gotz (2005) and Ohkawa et al. (2005) by showing that it 
is possible that only one of the two substituting goods will be produced in the free-entry 
equilibrium. Hence, free entry may lead to under-provision of goods.  
 Obviously, a similar result should hold for models with more 
than two goods.  
We shall now focus on the scenario in which each good is produced by only one type 
of firms. Denote the cost parameters of good 1 producers as  1 c  and  1 f , and good 2 producers 
as  2 c  and  2 f . Let  11 1 dc f = +  and  22 2 dc f = +  denote the respective average cost measure. 
Free entry implies that all surviving firms must make zero profits.
5
 
 Hence, for both 
goods to be produced in equilibrium, the following two equations must hold: 
**
12 1 QQ d +γ =α− , 
**
21 2 QQ d +γ =α− .               (4) 
 
Without loss of generality, we shall assume that  12 dd < . The next proposition states that 
whether both goods are produced in the free entry equilibrium depends on the value of the 
substitution parameter. 
 
Proposition 2.  In the free-entry equilibrium,   
(1) both goods are produced if  21 0 (d ) / (d ) ≤γ< α− α− ; 
(2) only good 1 is produced if  21 (d ) / (d ) 1 α− α− ≤γ≤ . 
 
Proof. It is straightforward to show that if  21 0 (d ) / (d ) ≤γ< α− α−  the curves corresponding to 
the two equations in (4) intersect at an interior point in the first quadrant of the (Q1, Q2) 
space.
6
21 (d ) / (d ) γ= α− α−
 This intersection point corresponds to the output levels of the two goods produced in 
the free-entry equilibrium. If  , the two curves intersect at a point on the  1 Q  
axis. Obviously, only good 1 producers produce at this intersection point. If 
21 (d ) / (d ) 1 α− α− <γ≤ , within the first quadrant, the curve  12 1 QQ d +γ =α−  lies entirely 
outside of the curve  21 2 QQ d +γ =α− . In this case, free entry will move (Q1, Q2) beyond the 
curve closer to the origin (i.e., the curve corresponding to  21 2 QQ d +γ =α− ). Moreover, since 
good 2 producers are driven out of the market once (Q1, Q2) moves beyond  21 2 QQ d +γ =α− , 
free entry will move (Q1, Q2) to the intersection point of  12 1 QQ d +γ =α−  with the  1 Q  axis. It 
                                                            
4 The result in Proposition 1 holds if the two goods are complements (γ < 0). This is because the arguments 
presented preceding Proposition 1 hold true for any negative γ. 
5 For simplicity, we ignore the integer problem and assume that the number of firms can be any nonnegative real 
number. In addition to the integer issue, other factors may also imply non-zero profits in the  free-entry 
equilibrium (e.g., Hurkensa and Vulkan 2003). 
6 Note that the same is true if γ < 0. Hence, both goods are produced if they are complements. 5 
 
follows that in equilibrium only the first equation in (4) holds and no good 2 producer is 
active. Summarizing the last two cases, if  21 (d ) / (d ) 1 α− α− ≤γ≤  then the free-entry 
equilibrium corresponds to the intersection point of the first equation in (4) with the  1 Q  axis 
and only good 1 is produced in equilibrium.  
 
  The results in this proposition are intuitive. If  0 γ= , the two goods are independent 
and entry of one type of firms has no effect on the survivability of the other type. Hence, in 
equilibrium both types enter and both goods are produced. If  1 γ= , the two goods are perfect 
substitutes. Free entry implies that only the type of firms (good 1 producers) with the cost 
advantage can survive. With imperfectly substituting goods, good 1 producers as the ones 
with a cost advantage will always exist. The survivability of good 2 producers depends on 
how close a substitute good 1 is. For small values of γ , the two goods are distant substitutes 
and good 2 producers survive. If γ  is large, the two goods are close substitutes and good 2 
producers cannot survive. The critical value of γ  is  21 (d ) / (d ) α− α− . As is obvious and 
intuitive, this critical value depends on the firms’ average cost parameters.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
We have shown two results about the free entry equilibrium in a Cournot market with 
substituting goods. First, each good is produced by only one type of firms. Second, whether 
both goods are produced depends critically on the level of substitution between the goods. 
With high substitution levels, only one of the goods is produced, while both are produced with 
low substitution levels. This result points to the possibility of under-provision of goods under 
free entry and Cournot competition. 
Dating back to Chamberlin (1933), economists have been interested in the issue of the 
market provision of variety. Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) were the first to 
provide rigorous examinations of the Chamberlinian monopolistic competition model. Their 
studies were followed by a sizable subsequent literature. Much of this literature focuses on 
price-taking firms in which each firm’s product is a different variety and firms have 
symmetric cost structures. In such settings, product variety corresponds to the number of 
active firms, thus entry and exit directly affect the provision of variety. In contrast, the present 
paper is concerned with non-price taking oligopolistic firms whose entry and exit do not 
directly affect variety. Hence, our finding that free entry can lead to under-provision of goods 
(variety) complements the findings in the monopolistic competition literature. 
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